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ABSTRACT 
In this article we outline the differences between 
leaking and whistleblowing, and provide possible 
justifications for leaking. We argue that, as a matter of 
principle, leaking information outside an organization will 
normally not further any public interest and should only be 
used as a last resort where problems have not been resolved 
internally. As uncontrolled leaking may be hazardous, we 
believe that the opportunity to blow the whistle in accordance 
with structured procedures offers a more satisfactory 
mechanism for exposing financial and other forms of wrongdoing 
(Carr and Lewis 2010). Next we describe how freedom of speech, 
whistleblowing legislation and internal reporting procedures 
provide alternatives to leaking and explain how they all 
operate unsatisfactorily in certain respects. In our analysis 
we refer to international conventions and the laws of four 
countries (USA, UK, France and Germany) that we consider 
representative of the different approaches to the treatment of 
whistleblowers. In conclusion, we suggest that regimes which 
are aimed at encouraging public interest disclosures through 
organizational insiders need improvement. Without this, 
unauthorized leaking could be tolerable in certain situations. 
Finally, we observe that public interest disclosure regimes 
need to take the human right dimension into account. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Both leaking and whistleblowing may be vital to the 
preservation of life and the promotion of healthy democracies. 
The disclosure of concerns about suspected wrongdoing by an 
organizational insider may become a critical source of 
information for those who are responsible for dealing with 
health and safety risks or combating financial crime. 
According to Agalgatti and Krishna (2004), the world’s worst 
industrial disaster (Bhopal, India, 1984) “is a tragic example 
of what could have been averted by alert whistleblowing”. At 
this Union Carbide plant, where thousands died as a result of 
gas escaping, the concerns of workers and a journalist were 
ignored by the local authority. Detailed investigations 
revealed that warnings were disregarded and cost-cutting 
measures had adversely affected work conditions and the 
maintenance of safety systems. In addition to helping to 
expose financial scandals, like those which occurred at BCCI, 
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Enron (Sterlin 2002) and WorldCom (Jeter 2003), public 
interest disclosures by organizational insiders remain 
important tools in the fight against corruption which itself 
contributes to poverty. Because corruption is notoriously 
difficult to detect and address through formal legal channels, 
especially in developing countries, it is important to provide 
other means by which corrupt practices can be exposed. 
The usefulness of such public interest disclosure for 
remedying problems on the one hand and the vulnerability of 
the discloser on the other has motivated some to elevate 
”whistleblowing” to a fundamental right in employment (Lewis 
2008). Although this demand has not been successful, there are 
laws which promote public interest disclosures by 
organizational insiders through protecting them from dismissal 
or from other forms of reprisal. This is generally achieved 
either through guarantees of freedom of speech at the 
workplace or through specific whistleblower legislation. 
Additionally some countries provide financial incentives for 
whistleblowers. Many employers have established internal 
reporting schemes that encourage the reporting of suspected 
wrongdoing, in some cases in response to a legal obligation or 
regulatory incentive. However, public interest disclosure in 
the form of ”leaking” is rarely protected and often unlawful. 
Despite the threat of legal sanctions for leaking and the 
availability of whistleblower protections, organizational 
insiders continue to leak instead of disclose information 
through normal communication channels. We believe that this is 
not only a result of increased facilities to leak information 
but is also a symptom that existing protections and incentives 
for authorized disclosure are inadequate.  
   
LEAKING AND WHISTLEBLOWING  
The word “leaking” commonly refers to the situation where 
a person gives confidential or unpublished information to 
somebody else. It covers political and commercial leaks in 
order to manipulate media coverage as well as leaks which are 
intended to expose wrongdoing at the workplace. Thus leaks may 
be made for personal gain and may not be motivated by any 
regard for the public interest. Indeed, the leaking of 
information solely for payment is the starkest illustration of 
the promotion of a private interest. Whistleblowng may also 
serve private interests, for example, exposing the fact that a 
personal grievance has not been rectified. Certainly it cannot 
be distinguished from leaking on the basis of whether the 
information is disclosed internally or externally, because in 
some situations concerns about wrongdoing are formally 
reported outside the organization that gives rise to them. 
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Perhaps the main difference between the two is that many 
countries provide legal protection for whistleblowers in 
specified circumstances, whereas leaking is frequently 
tortious and sometimes criminal. In order to protect or reward 
whistleblowers their identity must be known. By way of 
contrast, it is a feature of leaking that disclosers are 
anonymous or insist on their names being kept confidential. 
Since it is not always possible to preserve anonymity and 
confidentiality, both whistleblowers and leakers are 
vulnerable.1                       
Given the lack of protection for leaking, we need to 
consider why people engage in this activity. Apart from the 
private and political gains mentioned above, it needs to be 
recognised that some leakers will feel that they are promoting 
the public interest. One scenario is that a leaker knows that 
an act is lawful but regards it as offensive or immoral. An 
example may be where a person feels that a state has abused 
its powers to classify information as an official secret. 
Indeed, it has frequently been argued that excessive secrecy 
poses a threat to national security. A more worrying situation 
is that people may resort to leaking because the normal 
channels for raising concerns have broken down or are simply 
unavailable. Thus if the disclosure of serious wrongdoing 
internally or to an external regulator does not lead to an 
organisation taking any necessary remedial action, should a 
whistleblower drop the matter or is the public interest served 
by leaking/reporting the situation to the media? There is an 
increasing trend for countries to have legislation that 
permits disclosures to the media as a last resort2 but, where 
such reporting is not protected, individuals may become 
leakers. More generally, it could be argued that leaking is in 
the public interest wherever the law fails to protect those 
who disclose serious wrongdoing. One example is where 
reporting would amount to a criminal offence under official 
secrets legislation. Another is where statutory protection for 
whistleblowers is dependent on the discloser acting in good 
faith, as is normally the situation in the UK (Lewis 2008). A 
person who is uncertain about whether or not they will be 
protected may feel that they will be more secure if they leak 
anonymously. 
                                                            
1  Apart from accidental exposures, in some situations it will be possible 
to guess a leaker’s identity from the nature and/or circumstances of the 
information disclosure. 
2  For a recent example see the Australian Capital Territory’s Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 2012  
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Pre-internet, a person wishing to leak information had to 
identify a newspaper or journalist who was able to protect 
their identity and willing to publish (and possibly 
investigate) their concern. The internet now provides a speedy 
and efficient way to disseminate information while preserving 
anonymity. This can be done in isolation, for example, via 
blogs and Twitter, as well as through organisations like 
Wikileaks, GlobalLeaks etc. These organisations have websites 
that facilitate the uploading of documents and determine which 
information they want to publish. If they do not act in a 
timely fashion, the discloser may take the matter back into 
his or her own hands. One feature of offline compared with 
online disclosures is that pre–internet publishers were likely 
to scrutinise the documents provided and redact personal 
and/or dangerous information. Today there are more variable 
degrees of vetting. One effect is that some power has shifted 
from government, the media and employers towards leakers. As 
Hood (2011) puts it:    
”‘Wikileaks world’…….represents an approach to transparency 
quite different from that involved in freedom of information 
laws and corporate governance codes, in which formal obligations 
to disclose information have to be balanced against such 
considerations as security, privacy, and commercial 
confidentiality”. 
While the leaking of documents may cause governments to 
become more transparent, it could also have the opposite 
effect if they close themselves off from the media and the 
public. It has long been argued by politicians that leaking 
damages trust in government but so does unnecessary secrecy. 
In theory, freedom of information statutes could provide an 
alternative to leaking. However, there is little evidence of 
governments acting within the spirit of such legislation by 
proactively publishing information and ensuring that requests 
are responded to speedily and fully.  
While information might be leaked about anything, 
whistleblowing has been associated with disclosures of 
malpractice, as well as illegal acts or omissions. The current 
definition used by Transparency International (the global 
coalition against corruption) is “the disclosure of 
information about a perceived wrongdoing in an organisation, 
or the risk thereof, to individuals or entities believed to be 
able to effect action”. One obvious problem is the lack of 
consensus about what constitutes ‘wrongdoing’. Because there 
is no universally accepted definition of whistleblowing, the 
Australian Senate Select Committee on Public Interest 
Whistleblowing reached the conclusion that:  
…what is important is not the definition of the term, but the 
definition of the circumstances and conditions under which 
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employees who disclose wrongdoing should be entitled to 
protection from retaliation.3  
Whereas leaking normally refers to disclosures via the 
professional or social media, it is generally accepted that 
whistleblowing can be internal or external (Jubb 1999). 
Internal reporting would seem to offer advantages all round. 
The employer is given the chance to deal with concerns without 
external pressure and, from the worker’s perspective, once a 
problem has been aired externally they are more likely to 
suffer reprisals. From a legal perspective, while disclosures 
to higher management might be perceived by supervisors as 
disloyal, it cannot be treated as a breach of the common law 
duty of confidence or fidelity. In addition, the public might 
gain from the speedy rectification of wrongdoing without the 
need for investigation or expenditure by government agencies. 
Conversely, it could be argued that internal disclosures are 
not necessarily in the public interest as they facilitate 
cover-ups and may conceal systemic failures. 
 It is unfortunate that people may choose to leak 
information externally in circumstances where they would be 
protected if they reported through designated channels. One 
obvious reason for doing this may be that anonymous leaking is 
perceived as safer for the individual than other forms of 
disclosure. Unsurprisingly, there is a tendency to regard 
leaking as an illegitimate activity whereas whistleblowing in 
accordance with an employer or statutory procedure is viewed 
more positively. Thus if leaking is seen as a symptom of 
inadequate whistleblowing protection, the task for employers 
and Governments is to devise internal and external 
whistleblowing procedures that encourage confidential 
reporting to recipients who are in a position to take action 
in the public interest. Before examining some national 
provisions on whistleblowing, we briefly discuss the impact of 
international conventions.  
WHISTLEBLOWING AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
Before we consider constitutional provisions, we should 
record that reliance is often placed on human rights and other 
international conventions to protect whistleblowers (see also 
Banisar 2011 for an overview).4 For example, Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights states that:  
                                                            
3 Australian Senate Select Committee on Public Interest Whistleblowing, 
1994 para 2.2.  
4 In their report to the Parliamentary Assembly,2009, the Council of 
Europe’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights recommended that the 
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“(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This 
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers..... 
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it 
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in 
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” 
In most circumstances countries which impose limitations 
on freedom of speech are able to justify their actions under 
Article 10(2). Thus in R v Shayler5 the House of Lords (as it 
then was) found that the UK’s Official Secrets Act 1989 
inhibited the defendant’s freedom of expression under Article 
10(1) but found that this was justified under Article 10(2). 
Two notable exceptions are the decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR)in Heinisch v Germany6 (which is 
discussed in the next section) and Guja v Moldova.7 In the 
latter case there was held to be a violation of Article 10 
when an employee of the Prosecutor General’s office was sacked 
for leaking official letters to the press demonstrating 
political interference in ongoing investigations.  
In addition, article 33 of the UN Convention on 
Corruption (UNCAC) 2003 provides that:  
“Each State Party shall consider incorporating into its 
domestic legal system appropriate measures to provide 
protection against any unjustified treatment for any person who 
reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the 
competent authorities any facts concerning offences established 
in accordance with this Convention”.8  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Committee of Ministers “consider drafting a framework convention on the 
protection of ‘whistle-blowers’.” (Draft Recommendation 2.3) 
5  [2002] IRLR 11 
6 [2011] IRLR 922 
7  2008. Application No. 14277/04 
8 This came into force in 2005. See also the Council of Europe’s Criminal 
and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption (both 1999). For other 
international treaties see G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2011. Page 4. 
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This protects all types of people and is not restricted 
to those who raise concerns from within an organisation. 
However, this measure also requires the discloser to have 
‘reasonable grounds’ and it is unclear whether these are to be 
subjectively or objectively determined. It almost goes without 
saying that in some situations it will be difficult to 
distinguish between strong suspicions and reasonable grounds. 
Another problem is the non-mandatory nature of the provision - 
it does not require State Parties to have such measures in 
place but only that they consider providing protection for 
those who report concerns. Thus it is possible for States to 
argue that they have considered Article 33 but have decided 
not to adopt any measures as a consequence.  
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention does not contain any 
provisions that require the implementation of whistleblower 
protections. However, the OECD Working Group on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions recommended that states 
adopt appropriate measures that facilitate the reporting of 
foreign bribery (OECD 2009, recommendation IX). Further, in 
its ”Good Practice Guidance” the Working Group appeals to 
companies to adopt effective measures for internal reporting 
and remedial action (OECD 2009, Annex II). While some 
signatory states have followed these recommendations and also 
include in their progress reports actions taken with regard to 
whistleblowing, the Convention does not create a binding 
obligation on signatories to have national whistleblowing 
legislation. 
Mention should also be made of Article 5(c) of 
International Labour Organisation Convention No.158 on 
Termination of Employment9 which states that:  
…the filing of a complaint or the participation in proceedings 
against an employer involving alleged violation of laws or 
regulations or recourse to competent administrative 
authorities’ does not provide a valid reason for dismissal.  
This narrow formulation, which is only relevant to 
employment and does not deal with detriments short of 
dismissal, is likely to have limited impact on those 
deliberating about whether or not to report suspected 
wrongdoing.  
 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
                                                            
9 68th Session. 1982. 
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Some countries protect whistleblowers generally through 
guaranteeing constitutional freedom of speech at the 
workplace. In the four countries examined here, there are 
considerable differences in this respect. In Germany 
constitutional protection for freedom of speech is not only 
applicable in the public sector but also applies to horizontal 
(i.e. non-state to non-state) relationships. The latter is 
achieved through the theory of indirect third party effect 
(mittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundrechte), which obliges 
courts to take into account human rights when they interpret 
general clauses of the civil code, for example, good faith.10 
The Constitutional Court has clarified that employees can 
exercise their rights as citizens by reporting suspected 
criminal activities to the authorities and, unless there has 
been abuse of this process, the employee must not suffer 
adverse consequences for doing so.11 The Federal Labour Court 
has applied this principle so that an employee who discloses 
information to public authorities only breaches the duty of 
loyalty towards the employer if the disclosure is considered 
to be disproportionate having regard to the latter’s interests 
(cf. Rieble and Wiebauer 2010; or see Berthold 2010 for a 
collection and commentary of German jurisprudence). A 
proportionality approach means that the courts weigh the 
employee’s freedom to report suspected illegal behaviour 
against the business and property interests of the employer. 
In particular, the interest in business not being disrupted 
can be matched against the employee’s right to make a 
disclosure externally without making an internal report 
beforehand. Internal reporting is prioritised because it 
allows the employer to deal with the concern.12  The seriousness 
of the suspected wrongdoing and the employee’s expectations 
about whether or not the employer will effectively remedy the 
situation play an important role in determining whether the 
individual should have disclosed his or her suspicion 
internally before turning to an outside addressee.13 
Significantly, the final outcome of the investigation into the 
alleged wrongdoing is irrelevant to the decision about whether 
or not the employee was in breach of contract. Thus, suspected 
                                                            
10 Bundesverfassungsgericht 1 BvR 400/51 of 15 January 1958, BVerfGE 7, 
198.  
11 Bundesverfassungsgericht  1 BvR 2049/00 of 2. July 2001, at 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20010702_1bvr204900
.html (last accessed 24. June 2011) 
12 Bundesarbeitsgericht of 3 July 2006, 2 AZR 235/02, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Arbeitsrecht 2004, p. 427 et seq. 
13 Bundesarbeitsgericht of 7 December 2006, 2 AZR 400/05, Neue Zeitschrift 
für Arbeitsrecht 2007, p. 502. 
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serious wrongdoing could justify an immediate external report 
even if the allegation turns out to be untrue.14 Equally, 
reporting relatively minor concerns may be regarded as 
disproportionate even where wrongdoing is subsequently 
established.  
The protection of whistleblowers through the 
constitutional right to freedom of speech in accordance with 
the principle of proportionality offers flexibility in many 
different circumstances that detailed legal rules could not 
cover exhaustively. The downside of this approach is its 
vagueness. Actual and potential whistleblowers in Germany face 
uncertainty about how the proportionality principle will be 
applied in their particular case. To clarify the rights and 
obligations of employees in a whistleblowing situation, the 
German government attempted in 2008 to replace § 612a of the 
German Civil Code by a new statute. To a large extent this 
measure would have summarised the above mentioned 
jurisprudence, but it would also have provided some 
clarification about the circumstances in which an employee is 
not obliged to report internally before informing the public 
authorities. Some argued that the measure would have expanded 
employee rights to disclose externally and would have 
undermined the recent efforts of organisations to establish 
internal reporting procedures. Thus, owing to widespread 
resistance in the business world, this legislative measure 
failed (cf. Döse 2009).  
The weaknesses of relying on proportionality for 
whistleblower protection became manifest in the Heinisch 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).15 In 
this case the applicant was dismissed after heavily 
criticizing and filing a criminal complaint against her state-
owned employer (providing services for the elderly) alleging 
deficiencies in care resulting from staff shortages. While the 
applicant successfully challenged the dismissal in a German 
court of first instance, the judgment was later reversed by 
the state labour court of Berlin-Brandenburg. The state labour 
court found a significant breach of the duty of loyalty to the 
employer that could not be justified. Both the Federal Labour 
Court and the German Constitutional Court refused to hear 
appeals against this decision. When the applicant turned to 
the ECHR, this court accepted that the interference with the 
right to freedom of expression was “prescribed by law” and 
there was no dispute that the interference pursued the 
                                                            
14 Bundesarbeitsgericht of 7 December 2006, 2 AZR 400/05, Neue Zeitschrift 
für Arbeitsrecht 2007, p. 502. 
15  See note 5  above  
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legitimate aim of protecting the reputation and rights of 
others i.e. the business interests of her employer. Thus what 
had to be decided was whether the interference was ‘necessary 
in a democratic society’, in particular, whether there was a 
proportionate relationship between the interference and the 
aim pursued. The ECHR concluded that: 
“the public interest in having information about shortcomings 
in the provision of institutional care for the elderly by a 
State-owned company is so important in a democratic society 
that it outweighs the interest in protecting the latter’s 
business reputation and interests”. 
The conflicting conclusions reached by the ECHR and 
German courts do not assist in clarifying how the principle of 
freedom of speech applies to whistleblowing about workplace 
wrongdoing. Further, the ECHR noted that the employer was 
state-owned, which leaves some uncertainty about whether a 
different weighing of interests would occur in privately owned 
companies. 
The French Labour Code applies the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the constitution to the workplace irrespective 
of whether the employment is public or private. To take into 
account the legitimate interests and freedoms of the employer, 
French law also invokes a proportionality measure: Art. L 
1121-1 of the Labour Code specifies:  
”No restrictions to individual and collective human rights and 
civil liberties could be undertaken if they are not justified 
by the nature of the task and are proportional to the aim of 
such task.”.  
This differs from the German position in that French 
employment law provides for the direct “horizontal” 
applicability of fundamental freedoms. This has consequences 
where there is a potential conflict between the employee’s 
loyalty towards the employer and freedom of speech. Save in 
abusive cases, French employees do not breach their duty of 
loyalty if they exercise their freedom of expression in a 
whistleblowing situation (Morvan 2009, Adam 2010, Leborgne-
Ingelaere 2011).16 Proportionality analysis may – as in German 
law – suggest that internal reporting channels must be used by 
the employee under certain circumstances but in French law 
there is no principle of prioritising internal reporting (for 
a discussion see Adam 2010).  
                                                            
16  Note that Art. L 2281-1 to L 2281-3 of the French labour code protect 
employees from termination when they express their opinions about work 
contents and organization collectively in meetings that are held during 
workhours. Art. L 1121-1 is more general as it covers any kind of 
expression. 
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The French Cour de Cassation has recently dealt with Art. 
L 1121-1 of the Labour Code in two whistleblowing cases 
decided on the same day and confirmed French jurisprudence 
that is comparatively permissive with regard to freedom of 
expression at the workplace.17 In one the employee claimed 
damages for wrongful termination despite the fact that her 
allegations of sexual harassment by her superior were 
unproven. The court upheld the claim because the employee’s 
right to freedom of speech had not been abused - the fact that 
the allegations could not be proved was insufficient to 
establish that the report was made in bad faith. The second 
decision involved a woman employed by a Member of Parliament. 
She was dismissed after she had reported to the public 
prosecutor and the press that her employer had created a 
fictitious post for his daughter. The termination of 
employment was considered wrongful whether or not the Member 
of Parliament had actually broken the law and independently of 
the fact that the prosecutor discontinued the investigation. 
Despite French employment law being relatively protective of 
whistleblowers, a serious obstacle remains. In order to claim 
wrongful dismissal the employee must not only prove that a 
disclosure of wrongdoing was made but also that the employer 
terminated the employment relationship because of this - 
something that may be difficult to establish in practice. It 
is worth noting that, in relation to allegations of 
corruption, if an employee shows that a concern was raised, 
the employer must prove that the dismissal was for reasons 
other than this (see Adam 2010).   
 
In the US, the First Amendment protection18 in private 
employment relationships is restricted by the fact that the 
potential violation of the Constitution requires a ‘state 
action’. In essence, this excludes any ‘horizontal’ 
application of constitutional protections. However, U.S. 
courts have exceptionally applied the First Amendment in 
certain private cases, where a public function19 or public 
forum was involved or if there was a close nexus between the 
state and the private party concerned. Outside these narrow 
                                                            
17 See Cour de Cassation, Chambre Sociale, 29 September 2010, n° 09-42.057, 
F-D, Mme M. c/SA Spring Technologies ; Cour de Cassation, Chambre Sociale, 
29 September 2010, n° 09-41.544, F-D, M. J. c/ Mme K. See also the 
commentary of the judgments by Leborgne-Ingelaere (2011). 
18 The First Amendment to the US Constitution provides as follows: 
”Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances”.  
19 See Marsh v. Alabama 326 U.S. 501 (1946) 
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confines private sector employees are not able to use freedom 
of speech to protect themselves, for example, against a 
wrongful termination (Morvan 2009, p. 1023 et seq; Mendelsohn 
2009, p. 726; Barry 2007, p. 268 et seq). Thus legal 
protection for whistleblowers in the U.S. is largely dependent 
upon the scope of federal and state statutes. An example for 
limited protection of freedom of speech through statutory law 
is the protection offered to employees under section 7 of the 
National Labor Relations Act.20 The protection is limited 
because not all employees are covered, only “concerted 
employee action” qualifies for protection, and protected 
reports under the law’s “mutual aid and protection” 
requirement are confined to work condition issues and 
therefore do not necessarily cover reports that are made more 
generally in the public interest.21  
Following the Sarbanes –Oxley Act 2002, there has been a 
trend for US companies to introduce codes of ethics which 
offer disclosers of specified types of wrongdoing protection 
against reprisals. Whether particular non-retaliation 
guarantees will be regarded as legally binding will depend on 
the form of words used and whether the undertakings given are 
without prejudice to the application of the employment ‘at 
will’ doctrine (Moberly and Wylie 2011). It remains to be seen 
if such corporate practice effectively improves the conditions 
for employees to blow the whistle (we discuss corporate 
reporting systems below).  
By way of contrast, US government employees can comment 
on their employer’s activities and have free speech 
guaranteed. The First Amendment has been applied to public 
employees and interpreted to protect both state and local 
government whistleblowers. Remedies are available through the 
federal courts and include damages and costs as well 
reinstatement and back pay. Nevertheless, public sector 
employees may also face considerable difficulties (Barry 2007, 
Morvan 2009, Mendelsohn 2009). For example, in Garcetti v 
Ceballos22 a deputy district attorney filed a civil rights 
complaint alleging that he had suffered reprisals at work 
because he wrote a memorandum recommending the dismissal of a 
case about governmental misconduct. In denying his claims, the 
Supreme Court rejected “the notion that the First Amendment 
shields from discipline the expressions employees make 
pursuant to their professional duties”. Thus it is argued that 
                                                            
20 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000) 
21 For a criticism of the narrow scope of protection in section 7 NLRA from 
a freedom of speech perspective see Estlund (1992).  
22  547 U.S. 410 (2006), 
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a US government employee has more legal protection speaking on 
a public platform or taking allegations to the media than 
reporting to a supervisor. 
Compared to the situation in the U.S., the applicability 
of human rights in private employment relationships is less 
confined in UK law. Practical effect is given to the European 
Convention of Human Rights through Section 3(1) of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA). This states that: “So far as it is 
possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate 
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is 
compatible with the Convention rights”. In addition, Section 
6(1) makes it “unlawful for a public authority to act in a way 
which is incompatible with a Convention right”. Since this 
applies to courts and tribunals adjudicating on private 
disputes, it might be argued that the HRA produces the 
indirect horizontal effect achieved through the 
interpretational obligation of courts under German law. 
Certainly, the UK has not gone as far as achieving a partial 
direct applicability of fundamental freedoms in employment law 
as stipulated by the French Labour Code. Before the Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (now Part IVA Employment Rights 
Act 1996 (ERA 1996) came into force, little protection was 
afforded to whistleblowers by the common law and freedom of 
speech arguments were rarely deployed in cases where breach of 
confidentiality was alleged. To date the courts and tribunals 
have not been keen to accept submissions about freedom of 
speech in applying Part IVA ERA 1996, although there has been 
widespread recognition that retaliation against whistleblowers 
should be treated as a form of discrimination.23 As we will see 
in our discussion of whistleblowing legislation below, in some 
circumstances the UK statute does not offer the protection 
that has been afforded by the ECHR in its interpretation of 
Article 10 of the European Convention (see Heinisch case 
above).  
 
THE ROLE OF LEGISLATION IN ENCOURAGING AND PROTECTING 
WHISTLEBLOWERS AS LAW ENFORCERS 
It follows from what has been discussed so far that 
international comparisons which focus solely on specific 
legislation and do not take into account the level of 
constitutional freedom of speech at the workplace will result 
in a distorted view (see for example Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe 2009). France and Germany, two 
countries, that have  few specific laws on whistleblower 
                                                            
23  See, for example, Fecitt v NHS Manchester [2012] IRLR 64.  
15 
 
protection, have relatively high levels of protection for 
freedom of speech at the workplace which offer some succour to 
employees who blow the whistle. Indeed, where whistleblowing 
statutes limit the scope or nature of the disclosures that 
will be protected, the assistance provided by constitutional 
rights may be more valuable. For example, section 806 of the 
US Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 only protects disclosures 
pertaining to infringements of that statute and other U.S. 
Federal securities laws. Broader legislation, such as Part IVA 
ERA 1996 in the UK, also puts limits on the circumstances in 
which protection will be afforded. For example, the ‘good 
faith’ requirement that must be met in almost all situations 
could well inhibit the disclosure of serious wrongdoing if a 
worker fears that his or her motive may become an issue (see 
Lewis 2008). By way of contrast, in applying a proportionality 
test under freedom of speech provisions, malice could be a 
relevant factor but it would not necessarily exclude 
protection. It would be put in the melting pot but may be 
outweighed, for example, by the severity of the wrongdoing and 
the quality of the evidence provided.  
Under a principle of general freedom of speech at the 
workplace, employees may exercise their freedom on any subject 
and using any communication channel they wish, but this 
exercise may be limited in cases of abuse or in order to 
protect conflicting legitimate interests. By way of contrast,, 
legal systems that have sparse freedom of speech guarantees 
for employees in private work relationships and that rely on 
statutory whistleblower provisions start from the reverse 
principle. In these systems, organisation insiders may not 
have an express right to report wrongdoing and may be required 
to report through designated  procedures. 
The advantage of freedom of speech becomes most apparent 
when specific whistleblower protection is not available for a 
particular type of perceived wrongdoing. For example, 
criticism of work conditions that do not amount to a breach of 
legal obligations would not fall within the ambit of many 
whistleblower statutes but would be treated as the exercise of 
freedom of speech. The well-known French “Clavaud” ruling that 
an employee of the Dunlop Company acted within the limits of 
freedom of expression when he gave an interview in a newspaper 
criticizing work conditions,24 would not have been possible 
under much whistleblowing legislation. If constitutional 
guarantees of workplace freedom of speech are equivalent to or 
more valuable than specific whistleblowing laws, and if the 
primary goal is to facilitate the reporting of wrongdoing, the 
                                                            
24 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 28 April 1988, Bull. civ. V., No. 
257 
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debate about improving protection for whistleblowers should 
bear that in mind. Information technology that facilitates 
both speech and its surveillance and the increasing power of 
large corporations justify a discussion about the balance and 
legitimacy of the interests involved (Barry 2007). 
We contend that much whistleblower legislation has not 
only been used to protect speech and promote openness at the 
workplace but also, or even primarily, to encourage 
organization members to engage in public and private 
compliance schemes. Thus it can be argued that statutes 
protecting whistleblowers are aimed at improving the 
effectiveness of legal enforcement. On an international level, 
this holds particularly true with regard to the campaign 
against international bribery (see section 3 above on 
conventions). A prime example of a national provision that 
enlists private individuals for law enforcement purposes is 
the U.S. False Claims Act (FCA), which was introduced in 1863 
and revised in 1986. Under the FCA, an individual (the 
“relator”), who is often a former employee, can file a qui tam 
action against federal contractors claiming that the 
government has been defrauded. The government may join the 
action and, depending on the circumstances, the relator may 
receive between 15-30% of the damages awarded if the action 
succeeds. Given the apparent success of the FCA (see for 
example Carson et al. 2008 and Callahan et al 2004) it comes 
as no surprise that the qui tam approach has been expanded in 
recent U.S. legislation. In 2011, the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a final rule implementing 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act’s “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection” 
measures (see US SEC 2011). These offer rewards of between 10-
30% of the compensation that the SEC and the other authorities 
are able to collect to whistleblowers who report potential 
violations of U.S. Federal securities laws directly to the 
authorities.25 When the rules were initially proposed, 
companies were worried that people would bypass internal 
whistleblowing procedures, thereby weakening them, or would 
delay reporting in order to increase the reward. To some 
extent the final rules alleviate these problems by providing 
incentives for employees to report internally first and 
without delay (US SEC 2011, p.5-6). However, the SEC rejected 
the notion that exhausting internal reporting processes should 
                                                            
25 See Section 21F of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC 
rules section 240.21F-1 to 240.21F-17. The Rules are accessible at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545.pdf (last accessed 21. June 
2011). The first award was in 2012 and was for the maximum of 30%. 
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be a prerequisite for rewards (SEC 2011). The difference 
between the SEC’s approach and qui tam is that in the former 
the whistleblower does not become a party to the action 
initiated against the company. Nevertheless, from an 
enforcement perspective these mechanisms are functionally 
equivalent. In both the state enlists private citizens to 
acquire information for the public benefit and the private 
individual may receive part of the damages awarded against the 
defendant. 
To the extent that lawmakers view whistleblowing as an 
instrument to regain societal control over powerful private 
organizations (cf. Callahan et al. 2004), and taking into 
account that whistleblower legislation provides support for 
speech about specific types of wrongdoing, it is appropriate 
to situate whistleblowing statutes which do not provide 
financial rewards in the same private enforcement context as 
qui tam schemes. We would argue that such statutes, by 
offering protection against retaliation rather than financial 
incentives, rely on the various other motivations that may 
induce individuals to disclose suspected wrongdoing in the 
public interest (on the various motivations see Miceli et al. 
2008). Some countries have been reluctant to offer rewards to 
whistleblowers on the grounds that this would undermine the 
moral quality of disclosing in the public interest. However, 
given recent financial scandals and health and safety 
disasters, monetary incentives may now be viewed in a rather 
different light. One objection to ‘informers’ was that they 
profited from causing distress to others. However, if those 
that suffer as a result of disclosures are engaged in serious 
wrongdoing which threatens life or economic viability then 
society may view rewards as desirable if not necessary. 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that rewards improve the 
success of whistleblowing, if ‘success’ is measured in terms 
of willingness to report wrongdoing (see, for example figures 
reported by Carson et al. 2008, Callahan et al. 2004, Dyck et 
al. 2010.) Rewards offset the substantial personal risks that 
disclosers incur despite the existence of whistleblowing 
legislation. Between October 1987 and October 2010 the amount 
rewards actually paid to whistleblowers under the US False 
Claims Act was $2.877 billion. However, it is also necessary 
to mention the disappointing level of protection for 
whistleblowers under section 806 Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 (see 
Dworkin 2007, for an empirical study see Moberly 2007). It 
would seem that protection without financial reward may 
promote the moral reputation of whistleblowing. However, from 
a law enforcement perspective, protection without reward is 
low cost recruitment of the private citizen which is not 
particularly effective. If the state’s primary objective is to 
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encourage openness in organizations and safeguard individuals 
who feel the need to report wrongdoing, wish to express 
indignation or simply an opinion, the obvious road to take 
would be to introduce the broadest possible safeguards for 
freedom of speech. This does not exclude the possibility of 
having specific whistleblower laws if they expand and clarify 
the protection that fundamental rights already provide. 
 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, THE CONTROL OF INFORMATION AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST           
In all four jurisdictions discussed here organisations 
establish internal whistleblowing policies and procedures as 
part of their compliance programmes. There are various 
reasons why organisations adopt internal whistleblowing 
measures. First and foremost, they are established in order 
to secure and control potentially sensitive information that, 
if disclosed to third parties, could endanger the employer’s 
interests. Controlling information improves an organisation’s 
capacity to manage risks and to detect criminal or other 
conduct for which it would be vicariously liable. Research 
shows that whistleblowing procedures are designed to 
encourage the disclosure of a wide range of wrongdoing that 
could result in a loss of reputation and not just breaches of 
the law (see Lewis 2006). Thus internal whistleblowing 
arrangements can also be seen as a tool in the management of 
a company’s brand image. This might suffer if there was a 
perception that the organisation complies with the law but 
behaves unethically.                                 
While internal procedures might be helpful to an employee 
facing a dilemma about whether or not to disclose information 
and facilitate the exercise freedom of speech, we would argue 
that this is not their primary purpose. The control purpose 
of internal whistleblower schemes can be illustrated by the 
way in which external ombudspersons are used in Germany (see 
Rohde-Liebenau 2011). These are usually law firms retained by 
the company. This has the effect that only communications 
between the ombudsperson and the company are privileged; the 
whistleblower is unprotected unless a contractual agreement 
between the company and ombudsperson establishes rights. By 
using external ombudspersons, the company contracts out the 
collection of information from whistleblowers but retains 
full control over it. If the organisation wanted to offer 
help solely to employees, it could set up funds from which 
they could draw in order to consult a lawyer. This person 
would then advise the employee about the legal risks involved 
in disclosing information and the most appropriate steps to 
take. A confidential reporting facility would not be 
necessary in such a case, since the employee would be the 
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client and his or her communication with the lawyer would be 
privileged. However, we are not aware of companies that 
provide such a facility. 
Apart from the desire of organisations to control 
sensitive information for risk management purposes, an 
internal whistleblowing procedure may also be part of a 
compliance programme that is required or incentivized by legal 
provisions. However, apart from specific and clearly delimited 
areas such as money-laundering, anti-bribery, anti-terrorism, 
or health and safety laws, there are hardly any explicit legal 
obligations on employers to establish whistleblowing 
arrangements in the countries we are considering. It is more 
common that laws encourage or put pressure on organisations to 
integrate internal whistleblowing into their compliance 
management functions. For example, section 406 of the U.S. 
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 requires companies to state that they 
have adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers or 
explain the reasons why not. In implementing section 406, the 
SEC states in its rule § 229.406 (a) (4)26 that such “codes of 
ethics” must promote the “prompt internal reporting of 
violations of the code to an appropriate person or persons 
identified in the code”. Similarly, Section 7(2) of the UK 
Bribery Act 2010 provides a complete defence to the crime of 
failing to prevent bribery if the organisation can prove that 
it had “adequate procedures”.27 For an example outside the 
context of economic crime, there is the obligation under § 12 
of the German General Equal Treatment Act (Allgemeines 
Gleichbehandlungsgesetz – AGG)28 to take necessary measures to 
ensure protection against discrimination. To comply with this 
law, companies typically adopt ethics codes with internal 
whistleblowing mechanisms.29 Finally, there may be judicial 
incentives for the adoption of internal whistleblowing 
schemes. The U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines give judges 
                                                            
26 See 17 CFR Ch. II (4–1–10 Edition), p. 430, at 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2010/aprqtr/pdf/17cfr229.406.pdf (last 
accessed 21. June 2011) 
27  The general whistleblowing provisions in Part IVA Employment Rights Act 
1996 indirectly encourage the establishment of whistleblowing procedures. 
Employers who have them can argue that an external disclosure was 
unreasonable because an internal arrangement existed and this was not 
invoked by the worker. See Sections 43G & 43H ERA 1996. 
28 Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz vom 14. August 2006 (BGBl. I S. 
1897), translation and guidelines available at: 
http://www.antidiskriminierungsstelle.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/publikatio
nen/agg_wegweiser_engl_guide_to_the_general_equal_treatment_act.pdf?__blob=
publicationFile 
29 Schneider and Sittard (2007) raise doubts whether these are sufficient 
measures. 
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the discretion to mitigate sanctions for companies that have 
an effective compliance and ethics programme in place. For 
these purposes internal whistleblower arrangements can be 
treated as a relevant (Hess 2007).    
Chareirre Petit and Surply (2008, 127 et seq) put forward 
a possible development for internal whistleblowing procedures. 
They suggest that corporate policing through internal 
whistleblowing arrangements could help to reduce information 
asymmetries between management and shareholders, if employees 
acted as “agents” of the shareholders controlling the top and 
senior management. If we follow this idea, viewing internal 
whistleblowing as a corporate governance instrument is 
appropriate if it facilitates the communication of suspected 
wrongdoing to board level. Some companies have formal 
reporting hierarchies in place that reach the ethics, risk 
management or audit committees. For example, a company could 
empower a chief compliance officer to report directly to a 
board committee (or a supervisory board if top management 
behaviour is involved), and offer special protection against 
termination in order to ensure the compliance officer’s 
independence of top management.   
When legislation attempts to protect whistleblowers or 
offers incentives to those who report suspected wrongdoing 
directly to competent authorities, it could be argued that the 
state competes with employers for the disclosure of 
information. This is the case even where the relevant law also 
encourages internal whistleblowing. Corporate compliance 
systems can also be viewed as a private enforcement mechanism 
whereby the state enlists self-policing into its law 
enforcement. The competition exists because it is not 
guaranteed that corporate compliance systems always operate in 
the public interest. An internal system will only serve the 
public interest in the reporting and rectification of 
wrongdoing to the extent that this is consistent with the 
organisation’s risk management interests (see above). If these 
interests do not converge, there may be situations where 
employers do not want to reveal wrongdoing that they become 
aware of, perhaps because they have not dealt with it. 
Whistleblower protection or incentive laws do not make 
internal reporting a prerequisite, because this would amount 
to a prioritization of the company’s risk management interests 
over the public interest in learning about wrongdoing. The 
more whistleblower laws encourage external whistleblowing by 
offering generous rewards, the more companies will feel 
pressurised to design effective internal reporting 
infrastructures. To be effective such policies and procedures 
should be clearly communicated, make advice available to 
potential whistleblowers, offer financial incentives and 
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provide feedback about the results of investigations etc. (for 
good practices see: British Standards Institute Publicly 
Available Specification. 2008) 
  
SOME LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF HAVING INTERNAL REPORTING 
PROCEDURES 
Increasingly, corporate compliance programmes spell out 
the disclosure ‘duties’ of employees. Analyzing the contents 
of ethics policies of 56 large European companies, Hassink et 
al. (2007) record that nearly two -thirds of these ‘required’ 
employees to disclose information about wrongdoing. In 
different national laws, the employment relationship is 
characterized by the use of implied terms, such as loyalty, 
trust, good faith and fidelity that give rise to rights and 
obligations. Through such terms the law integrates not only 
policy considerations but also the expectations of the 
parties, which may shift with the prevailing moral and 
economic climate. The increased incidence of internal 
whistleblowing procedures, irrespective of whether they 
directly create legal rights and obligations, is legally 
relevant because they generate expectations which affect the 
interpretation of terms. For example, where there is no 
express term, it might be argued that an implied duty to co-
operate obliges employees to invoke a procedure if it is 
applicable.30 In jurisdictions that do not or hardly protect 
freedom of speech at the workplace there are few legal 
barriers that prevent companies from imposing contractual 
duties on staff to report wrongdoing. In the US, the First 
Amendment’s guarantees could only prevent lawmakers from 
adopting laws that introduce general whistleblowing duties for 
all employees (Rutzel 1995, p. 43 et seq). General 
whistleblowing duties of employees should not be confused with 
the role of gatekeepers (such as lawyers, auditors, etc), 
whose reporting duties could resemble forms of compulsory 
whistleblowing (see Tippett 2006). Further, it is not 
uncommmon for top managers, or for managers with specific 
compliance and oversight functions within a company to be 
treated as fiduciaries and to have duties to whistleblow 
imposed upon them.31  Apart from these cases, workers face 
                                                            
30 Apart from any legal obligation, as Tsahuridu and Vandekerckhove (2008) 
observe, the mere encouragement of employees to raise concerns internally 
may give rise to a moral obligation to blow the whistle.   
31 See, for example, Ranson v Customer Systems plc (2012) EWCA Civ 841. 
This could have the effect of lightening the burden on less senior 
employees to speak up or, alternatively, it might encourage them to do so. 
See for reporting duties of compliance officers the German Federal Court in 
Bundesgerichtshof, 5 StR 394/08 of 17. July 2009.  
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considerable difficulties when confronted by a duty to report 
wrongdoing, particularly in ascertaining what evidence or 
level of suspicion is required for the obligation to come into 
play. Some of the practical problems have been discussed 
elsewhere (see Lewis 2011a) so it is sufficient to note here 
that the imposition of an obligation to report wrongdoing may 
turn out to be counter-productive in terms of compliance 
management.  
There are additional legal issues that need to be considered 
in devising internal whistleblowing procedures. First, there 
is the need to comply with data protection and privacy laws. 
In the authors’ opinion it is perfectly possible to reconcile 
reporting procedures (including anonymous hotlines) with such 
provisions if detailed attention is paid to protecting the 
identity of both whistleblowers and those who are the subject 
of allegations (Lewis 2011b, Pagnattaro and Peirce 2008). For 
example, we would argue that those who are the subject of 
allegations have the right to be notified of that fact but not 
until there has been a preliminary investigation to see if 
there are grounds for suspicion.32 In most situations it would 
be unhelpful to reveal the identity of those making unfounded 
allegations as it might deter others from whistleblowing in 
more meritorious cases. However, when knowingly false 
information has been supplied which causes damage to an 
individual that person may wish to learn who was responsible 
so that legal proceedings can be brought.33  
                                                            
32  We would contend that the employer’s duty of care requires him or her 
not to cause stress by conveying unfounded allegations. 
33 A special problem occurs when foreign laws impose the adoption of 
reporting systems that may conflict with domestic data protection laws. The 
shifting policies of the French data protection agency (Commission 
nationale informatique et libertés, CNIL) illustrates the issue. After 
initial reservations ”of principle”, the agency, under the pressure of 
French companies or French subsidiaries of foreign companies subject to the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act, adopted a policy of ”single authorization” in 2005 that 
facilitated the adoption of corporate reporting systems. This policy had to 
be amended following the French Cour de Cassation’s ruling regarding the 
code of business conduct of Dassault Systèmes (of 8 december 2009, n° 08-
17.191, D. 2010. 548). The CNIL  had to clarify that the exclusive purpose 
of data collection and recording under the ”single authorization” is to 
address concerns in the fields of anti-competitive practices, accounting, 
financial, banking and corruption, and to comply with laws (cited are 
French laws, the U.S. Sarbanes Oxley Act and the Japanese Financial 
Instrument and Exchange Act of 2006). The reporting of any other concern is 
not covered by the single authorization anymore. Either employees should 
report such concerns through the other reporting channels e.g., through  
line managers, employees’ representatives, public authorities, or, if the 
whistleblower system is used, no data may be collected and recorded (cf. 
CNIL, 8 December 2010, Official Journal of the French Republic No. 0284, 
No. 95).  
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More problematic is the fact that, in jurisdictions that 
guarantee fundamental rights at the workplace, internal 
procedures might be illegal to the extent that they attempt to 
prevent external disclosures of information. Conversely, the 
right to silence in order to avoid self-incrimination might 
also have an impact.34 In a legal system that provides for the 
direct ‘horizontal’ effect of constitutional provisions in 
private employment relationships the imposition of a general 
whistleblower duty might be challenged on the grounds that it 
is disproportionate. For example, Coeuret and De Sevin (2006) 
argue that whistleblower obligations in company policies would 
be void under art. L 120-2 (today art. L 1121-1) of the French 
Labour Code. Countries that provide freedom of speech 
protections through the interpretative obligation of the 
courts (for example, Germany) would produce a similar result. 
The proportionality test would apply in the context of 
interpreting the employee’s loyalty or ‘thoughtfulness’ 
(Rücksichtsnahme) obligations or the law relating to unfair 
contract terms. A general duty to report any wrongdoing would 
probably fail the test. The notion of proportionality would 
give rise to questions about whether there are any other 
measures available that are also effective for detecting and 
preventing wrongdoing which are less intrusive. Such 
alternatives would be encouragement through rewards, 
transparent reporting procedures (including information on how 
disclosures are managed) and guarantees of protection. The 
employer’s expectation that staff will make use of internal 
whistleblowing procedures would only harden into a legal duty 
in exceptional cases, for example, when it could be 
demonstrated that an employee’s disclosure could effectively 
prevent substantial damage to the undertaking. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The technological possibilities that now facilitate 
leaking put pressure on employers to provide more functional 
communication systems and on countries to devise 
constitutional and/or statutory rights that encourage and 
protect the reporting of wrongdoing and ensure that necessary 
remedial actions are taken. Given the piecemeal nature of the 
current international conventions and the uneven protection 
afforded to whistleblowers by ILO member states, it might be 
                                                            
34 The right to remain silent under police questioning and the privilege 
against self-incrimination are generally recognised international standards 
which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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argued that this issue should now be addressed with some 
urgency.  
When analysing protections for whistleblowers, it is too 
simplistic to solely focus on whistleblower laws. The scarcity 
of specific whistleblower legislation in countries such as 
France and Germany is compensated not only by a generally high 
level of employment protection but also by recognition of the 
right to freedom of speech at the workplace. However, we have 
also identified considerable problems that dissuade 
whistleblowers from using normal reporting channels to address 
wrongdoings. In the US, where whistleblower statutes have the 
effect that private citizens are enlisted for law enforcement 
purposes, employees and other organizational insiders are 
provided with incentives to report certain violations, yet 
only within the limited scope of existing statutory 
provisions. The United Kingdom is more difficult to situate in 
the analysis undertaken here. It can be argued that the 
legislation on protected disclosures promotes freedom of 
speech in both the public and private sectors. Equally, the 
law also facilitates private enforcement objectives. Yet, it 
remains to be seen how these two objectives – law enforcement 
through private enlistment and the promotion of freedom of 
speech at the workplace – can be achieved in situations of 
conflict.    
This article raises awareness that whistleblowing can 
only be dealt with in a broader context of fundamental rights 
of employees. Our intention is to broaden discussion about how 
freedom of speech can be underpinned at the workplace. In this 
context it is worth noting that in 1997, two pressure groups, 
Freedom to Care and Whistleblowers Australia, jointly proposed 
an amendment to ILO Convention 111 on Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation)1958.35 This would have offered 
protection to employees who blow the whistle on matters of 
public interest and would have taken the form of an amendment 
to the definition of discrimination in Article 1. In the 
authors’ opinion, reprisals against whistleblowers are a form 
of unequal treatment that constitutes a violation of human 
rights. We therefore endorse the view that victimisation 
against whistleblowers should be equated with other forms of 
discrimination and would urge that an ILO Convention should 
protect those who disclose all types of serious wrongdoing. 
Failing that, a Convention might cover specific types of 
reporting, for example, about corruption, bullying and 
harassment and risks to health and safety. 
                                                            
35  42nd Session, 1958.  
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Finally, although it might be possible to “dry out” 
leaking platforms by prosecuting operators and leakers, we do 
not think that this would provide a constructive or long 
lasting solution. We believe that better protection for 
freedom of speech, together with comprehensive statutory 
whistleblower protection and more effective internal reporting 
procedures would make repressive measures unnecessary. Leaking 
would become less attractive. Today, no country or company can 
claim to have perfect communication systems in place. This 
being the case, we assert that when systems break down it is 
in the public interest to learn about serious wrongdoing via 
leaks rather than not to hear about it at all. 
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